The rollout of Rural Free Delivery (RFD) in the early twentieth century dramatically increased the frequency with which rural voters received information. This paper examines the effect of RFD on voters' and Representatives' behavior using a panel dataset and instrumental variables. Communities receiving more routes experienced higher voter turnout and spread their votes to more parties. RFD shifted positions taken by Representatives to ones in line with rural communities, including increasing support for pro-temperance and anti-immigration policies. Our results are stronger in counties with newspapers, supporting the hypothesis that information flows play a crucial role in the political process.
As the whole world has been drawn closer together by the inventions and uses of steam and electricity, so farmers may be drawn closer together by the universal practice of free delivery.
-Matthew Williams of Vemdale, Minnesota as quoted in the 1900 Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture
Introduction
Changes to information flows affect the behavior of both the electorate and politicians.
Almond and Verba wrote, in their seminal 1963 book, "the man with limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a higher level of education."
When deciding whether to vote and for whom to vote, coordinating with other voters, and interacting with their elected officials, potential voters rely on information from candidates, media sources and other potential voters. However, information networks and access to mass media are usually endogenous to political activity, limiting researchers' ability to identify settings through which to measure the causal effects of information on political outcomes.
Rural Free Delivery (RFD), which introduced daily mail to millions of rural homes at the turn of the twentieth century, provides us with a unique opportunity to explore this relationship.
The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw great changes in how information was acquired and disseminated throughout the United States. The invention of the web rotary press made large-scale newspaper and magazine printing runs possible, and the introduction of radio dramatically reduced the marginal cost of disseminating information.
The establishment of telegram and telephone lines across the country increased the speed of interpersonal communication. These developments had great potential to affect the political process, as they changed the ability of individuals to acquire information, and of political candidates and parties to send messages to voters. These advancements were especially important for residents of rural areas, whose isolation was an acute concern for policy-makers.
1 This isolation was notably apparent in rural residents' lack of access to daily mail. Since 1864, city dwellers enjoyed either at-home mail delivery or close proximity to post offices, while rural residents were forced to travel several miles to the nearest post office. These concerns led to a push for the expansion of daily mail delivery to rural homes. Created on an experimental basis in 1896, and rolled out across the country during the first decade of the twentieth century, RFD changed the flow of information to rural communities and the information networks within them.
Any attempt to measure the causal effect of voter information on political outcomes faces a severe endogeneity problem. People with more robust information networks will vote in different ways, elect representatives with different characteristics, and elicit different results from these representatives than people with less robust information networks; this asymmetry is due to a number of variables and characteristics, many of which are unobserved.
We address this problem in two ways. First, RFD caused an almost immediate change in the availability of information to individuals affected by the service, which allows us to use a panel dataset to control for time-invariant county characteristics. Second, because eligibility for the service was determined by a complex set of rules established by the United States
Post Office, we can use a set of instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect of RFD on political activity.
We find that RFD routes increased the competitiveness of Congressional elections, measured through the number of parties receiving 5%, 10%, or 20% of the vote within a county.
This increase in competition appears to have benefited small parties, as the share of the vote going to neither the Republican nor Democratic party increased with more RFD routes.
However, we do not find a statistically significant change in the turnout of Congressional elections. The observed effects are larger in communities with daily newspapers, providing support to the hypothesis that RFD changed voting behavior primarily by changing the level of information available to voters. We also find a change in the behavior of elected officials in response to RFD allocation. The policy positions of members of the House of Representatives shifted towards stances associated with rural communities. In particular, we study the contentious issues of temperance and restricting immigration, and find that RFD routes increased the support for both.
Motivation
According to contemporary reports, Rural Free Delivery led to significant changes in rural communities in three areas: the amount of mail sent and received, newspaper circulation, and the quality of roads in RFD communities. Increased mail and better roads affected the bidirectional flow of information, while higher newspaper circulation changed the dissemination of information. Each of these effects changed the structure of networks and information flows in rural communities, and could have changed the way in which voters reached their decisions and their relationships with their Congressional Representatives.
The relationship between information and voter behavior is complicated, empirical results have differed and depend on the nature of that information. Gentzkow et al. (2011) showed that the entrance of the first newspaper in a county led to a small but significant increase in voter turnout. However, television may have had the opposite effect. Gentzkow (2006) found that television has decreased turnout in Congressional elections by two percent per decade. Using data from a field experiment, Gerber et al. (2009) showed that people in Virginia who received a newspaper, regardless of its political slant, were eight percent more likely to vote for a Democrat for governor in the 2005 elections. This experiment it notable, because those chosen to receive a newspaper had many other methods of obtaining newsother newspapers, radio, television, and the Internet were all available mediums-and yet receiving a daily paper still changed voter behavior. In a less information rich environment, Banerjee et al. (2010) conducted a field experiment in India, found that when voters were provided with newspapers reporting on audits of incumbents, they rewarded high-performing incumbents.
Given these findings, the ex ante expectation of the effect of RFD unclear. If RFD led to an increase in local newspaper readers, we would expect to find an increase in voter turnout.
As we will show, we do find an expansion of local newspaper circulation. However, one proposed interpretation for the depressing effect of television on turnout is the substitution away from local to national news, which led to voter who are less informed about local elections. Thus, if this same service led to a disproportionate increase in national or regional newspapers, RFD could lead to a decrease in turnout. If this increase in news gave voters more information about the views of their Representatives, this may also change who they vote for.
Since RFD did not affect all communities equally, these changes would have also affected the distribution of voters. Increased connectivity in rural communities could have also affected the ability for rural voters to coordinate their votes behind individual parties or candidates, and to advocate for specific policies. Small parties, including the Greenback and Populist parties, advocated farmer-friendly policies, while the Grange continued to be a strong unofficial political player.
3 Lacking centralized political machines, the ability of many of these groups to reach rural voters may have been minimal, and therefore would have benefited the most from RFD.
Richer levels of information and connectivity translate to increased social capital, which research has shown leads to an increased ability of voters to elicit favorable policies from elected officials. Strömberg (2004) found that communities in the United States with increased access to radio broadcasts received greater relief funds from the federal government during the New Deal. In Strömberg's model, this increase in political power is driven by an increased likelihood that voters learn about the behavior of their elected officials. When one group becomes better informed, politicians change their behavior by choosing policies favored by the better informed group. Within the context of RFD, this translates to a prediction that Representatives in Congressional districts that receive more routes would shift their positions towards policies favored by rural communities.
Supporting the idea that information about elected officials changes outcomes, Ferraz and Finan (2008) showed that when audits reported two instances of corruption of mayoral incumbents in Brazil the likelihood of incumbent re-election decreased by seven percent compared to the control group. Gentzkow et al. (2006) found the conversion of newspapers from being politically-affiliated to independent, which occurred rapidly in the period before 1920, to be correlated with a decrease in political corruption. Drago et al. (2013) showed that newspaper exit in Italy corresponded to increases in political corruption. Campante et al.
(2013) examines a slightly later period in Italy, testing effect of the rollout of broadband
Internet access on voter turnout. They found a nuanced effect, as voter turnout initially decreased but later rebounded as people engaged with political organization on the Internet; these later effects were particularly influential at helping voters on the fringes of the political spectrum voice their concerns and affect outcomes.
The motivation for such empirical work lies in voting models of imperfect information and models outlining the social motivation for voting. The importance of well-informed voters goes back to Condorcet's Jury Theorem from 1785, which assumes that voters are well informed. In describing what they call the "Swing Voter's Curse, " Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) illustrate the role of information on the potential voter's decision to participate in an election and his ability to influence the behavior of others. The "Bandwagon Effect"
described by Simon (1954) , Bowden (1987) , and Mehrabian (1998) , predicts that people will become more inclined to vote for a candidate as the candidate's odds of winning increase.
Given that a voter's perception of a candidate's popularity with other voters most likely comes from media sources and polls, this too is a story of information.
This paper contributes to two literatures: the relationship between information and po-litical behavior, and historical studies of the effects of RFD. The literature on Rural Free
Delivery is less rich than that on the complex relationship between voter information and politics. While Fuller (1955 Fuller ( , 1959 Fuller ( , 1964 
Rural Free Delivery
While daily mail delivery is now taken for granted, the disparity in the quality of service between rural and urban households in the United States in the late nineteenth century is difficult to overstate. Though people living in cities enjoyed close proximity to post offices or direct home delivery, the only way for rural homes to receive or send mail was to travel to the nearest fourth class post office, typically the nearest general store. Even in the best conditions, a trip to the post office for someone who lived five miles away would likely entail three and a half hours of travel. Conditions were seldom ideal, making travel times much longer, and the mail itself was often delayed (Fuller, 1964, pg. 15) . In periods of bad weather, families living on farms would sometimes go weeks at a time without mail.
RFD was conceived as a way to address this disparity of postal service by bringing free no longer feels the isolation of country life. I think the system will contribute largely to prevent the threatened congestion of population in our cities and town" (Greathouse, 1900) .
The first high profile call for RFD came in 1891, from Postmaster General John Wanamaker. To test the feasibility of RFD, he proposed that the Post Office implement limited delivery in a few rural towns (Fuller, 1964, pg. 18 ). This experiment was delayed for several years due to insufficient allocation of funds from Congress and two changes in Postmaster in three years. (Fuller, 1964, pg. 21, 24) . In 1896, the first experimental routes (82 in all) were established (Fuller, 1964, pg. 39) . In 1898, when only 412 routes existed nationwide, the Post Office formalized the mechanism for route allocation: communities wishing to receive a route were to petition their Representative, and route establishment required approval from both the Representative and Postmaster. Due to several well-publicized successes in county-wide RFD networks, Representatives were inundated with petitions from farm communities. In the face of widespread constituent support for the program, even Representatives initially opposed to RFD were forced to support the program (Carpenter, 2000) .
The 1903 Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture described the process thus:
The delivery of mails by rural carriers is extended in response to petitions presented by the people desiring the service upon forms prepared by the Department, which include a diagram of the proposed route. It is required that the route shall be from 20 to 25 miles in length, so laid out that the carrier will not have to traverse the same road on his return as on his outward trip, and so adjusted that at least 100 domiciles shall be included in the service. Such a petition, when presented to the Department with the approval of the Congressional Representative of the district or of one of the Senators from the State in which the service is asked for, is investigated by one of the special agents in the field, who transmits the papers, with a map of the route or routes to be followed, to the Superintendent in Washington for his adjudication.
These guidelines were determined by the feasibility and cost effectiveness of mail delivery and were the same as those outlined by the Post Office in 1898. One hundred families was deemed to be the minimum number of households necessary to justify a route, while 25 miles was viewed as the longest route mail carriers could reliably serve. Additionally, a route could not be established where roads were not passable year-round (Fuller, 1964, pg. 182) . These regulations applied equally to all communities; even if a town had the misfortune of featuring rough terrain or impassable roads, the Post Office did not exercise leniency in its decision to approve or reject a route. Additionally, these official guidelines were largely unchanged during the duration of the rollout of RFD. 6 It is important for our identification strategy that these guidelines were not determined by Representatives, whose motivations may have been political. A map of a rural route can be seen in Figure 1 ; the local post office can be seen in the northwest corner of the map, with the route leaving from and terminating at that location. Maps such as these were included with petitions for routes.
In the face of mounting pressure from rural communities, Congress made RFD a permanent program in 1902. Rapid expansion of RFD followed quickly, as seen in Figure 2 .
Between 1900 and 1908, the number of RFD routes increased from 1,259 to 39,277. Although many communities were left unserved, additional route allocation all but halted by 1908. By that year, more than 88% of routes that would ever be extant had been established (Kernell, 2001 (Fuller, 1964, pg. 78) . For these reasons, we consider the rollout of RFD to be the years 1901 to 1908. In our analysis, we consider only pre-and post-rollout years.
Route allocation was correlated with a number of factors that were likely associated with different levels of political activity. Communities had to apply for routes; therefore, more motivated communities would have received routes more quickly. Additionally, because routes required sponsorship by a Representative, a community's success in receiving a route was in part a function of Representative characteristics, specifically party membership and experience. In its infancy, RFD was seen as a Republican program, and Carpenter (2000) provides evidence that route allocation was denser in Republican districts.
To address this endogeneity problem, we use both place and time fixed effects and instrumental variables in our estimations. By using county (and later in our analysis, Congressional district) fixed effects, we control for time-invariant, unobserved location characteristics.
However, as we will show, the inclusion of fixed effects will not provide unbiased estimates.
Therefore, we use a set of instruments correlated with route allocation. In the presence of place fixed effects, our identifying assumption is that the instruments are uncorrelated with trends in our outcome variables.
Effect on Voters
The estimation of the effect of RFD rollout on voter behavior proceeds in two parts: a fixed effects estimation (section 4.1) and an instrumental variables estimation (section 4.2).
The bulk of the data is discussed in section 4.1.1, while the collection of the data for the instrument is discussed in Appendix B.
Fixed Effects Estimation
To understand how counties that received more RFD routes changed compared to those that received fewer, we use a fixed effects model with year and place fixed effects to control for time and place-invariant characteristics. The basic specification for each of our county-level political outcomes is:
where Y ct are our political outcomes, such as voter turnout; γ c and δ t are a set of county and year dummies; X ct is a vector of county characteristics: percent of the county's population living in communities of more than 2,500 people and the square of that value, the percent of farmland that was "improved," the percent of non-white residents, the percent of white, foreign-born residents, 7 the natural log of the population, and dummies for the presence of Jim Crow voting laws and whether women had the right to vote; Routes ct is the number of routes in county c in year t. Therefore, β, the coefficient on the number of routes, is the estimate of the causal effect of RFD routes.
Our focus in this paper is the effect of the complete allocation of routes, as opposed to the timing of route allocation. We therefore eliminate the years 1901 to 1907 from our analysis.
Additionally, we hold the number of routes in all years 1908 and later constant at their 1908 values, and all years 1900 and earlier fixed at their 1900 values. Given the possibility of state-level shocks (such as Gubernatorial elections), we cluster standard errors at the state level.
7 All percents are expressed as a number between 0 and 100.
Data
We compiled the county-level RFD route allocations using the 1908 United States Official Postal Guide, which listed the number of RFD routes emanating from each post office. This gives a measure of the intensity of RFD service within a county. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to compile statistics on the full allocation of routes. We also compiled the 1900 number of routes in each county using the 1900 Report of the Postmaster General.
Our voting data are from Clubb et al. (2006) , which provides data on county-level voting in each year, including total number of votes, turnout, and vote share for most major and minor parties in elections for the House of Representatives. 8 County characteristics data are from Haines (2010) . We used the method described in Hornbeck (2010) We constructed our newspaper dataset by supplementing an existing dataset by Gentzkow et al. (2012) , which provides circulation data on all English-language daily newspapers printed within a county, excluding professional or social publications. We added data on semi-weekly and three times weekly papers, using the N.W. Ayer and Son's American Newspaper Annual. This variable does not provide perfect data on newspaper readership, as newspapers consumed in different counties than where they are printed are incorrectly attributed to the printing county. However, Gentzkow et al. (2012) estimated that more than 80% of current newspapers are read in the counties in which they were printed, and claim that this estimate is likely larger for our period of study. Table 1 shows the trends in most of our outcome and explanatory variables. 9 Voter 8 Senate seats were assigned by state legislatures until 1914, and are therefore omitted from this analysis. All Congressional election outcomes refer only to elections for the House of Representatives.
9 Although the table does not show statistics on mid-term elections, these years are included in our turnout decreased and newspaper circulation increased significantly over our sample period.
By comparing the change in daily newspaper circulation to that of biweekly and three-times weekly newspapers, we can see that the increase in circulation was driven entirely by the expansion of daily papers (as expected from the work of Fuller (1964) ). Table 2 shows the allocation of RFD routes in 1908; the average number of routes was about 14, while 81% of all counties received at least one route.
Motivating our exploration below, Figure 3 shows the results of running a local polynomial smoothing on a number of voter outcomes (turnout, number of parties receiving at least 5% or 20% of votes, 10 and the share of votes received by a party that is not Republican or Democrat) by the number of RFD routes a county has in 1908. We consider the pre-rollout without the term for routes in 1908 against the number of routes in a county 1908. For all outcomes but turnout this figure shows a pattern in the differences between the pre-and post-period averages that starts at zero for counties that received very few routes and that increases with number of routes. This suggests that the number of routes received is related to increases in the number of competitive parties, but not to levels of voter turnout.
Fixed Effects Results
First, we consider voter turnout in congressional elections, using as our dependent variable the percentage of eligible, voting-age adults who cast a vote in elections. Table 3 shows the sample. 10 The pattern for number of parties receiving at least 10% of votes is very similar, and is omitted out of space concerns.
OLS regression results; an additional route is correlated with a 0.0945% decrease in voter turnout in Congressional elections (compared to a mean of 59.4). A one standard deviation change in the number of routes results in a 1.35 percentage point change in turnout. However, this result is not statistically significant. We also convert our route variable into a dummy variable equal to one if a county has a route, and zero otherwise. Receiving RFD at all is associated with a 2.7%, statistically significant drop in voter turnout.
Next, we consider election competition. We constructed a set of variables that measure the number of candidates who receive vote shares above certain thresholds. Since any threshold is arbitrary, we use several (5, 10, and 20 percent).
11 These thresholds allow us to measure the number of parties that achieve a level of political support within a county. We use this instead of the margin of victory, a more obvious measure of competitiveness. We do this because treatment (RFD routes) vary at the county level, while margins of victory vary only at the Congressional district level. This allows us to use within-district variation in RFD routes and political competitiveness.
The OLS regressions of RFD routes on the number of parties show that more routes are associated with broader support for parties, as seen in columns 3-5 of Table 3 . Counties that received more routes changed their voting behavior by voting for a wider variety of parties.
Regardless of the threshold, the coefficient on RFD routes is statistically significant, with an additional route being associated with an increase in the number of competitive parties within a county of between 0.0035 and 0.0055.
To better understand these findings, we consider the cumulative vote share of small parties, which we identify as any party other than Republican and Democrat. Using this vote share as the dependent variable, we use the same specification as before. Lower information transmission costs may be more beneficial to small parties, whose low visibility may have made it difficult to attract votes before the introduction of RFD. Additionally, voters' ability to coordinate behind less visible candidates may have increased with the introduction of RFD.
The results are presented in column 6 of Table 3 . The coefficient of 0.11 is statistically significant and means that a one standard deviation change in the number of routes is associated with a 0.12 standard deviation change in the vote share of small parties within a county. Taken along with the results from columns 3-5, we can see that counties that received more routes changed their voting behavior by voting for a wider range of parties, to the benefit of smaller political parties.
The effect of RFD on turnout may seem counter-intuitive. However, given the endogenous nature of route allocation, we cannot interpret the OLS estimates as unbiased, and previous research suggests a downward bias to all of our estimates. Kernell and McDonald (1999) provide evidence that Representatives facing competitive elections prior to the establishment of RFD were more motivated to acquire routes for their districts. Voter turnout is typically higher in competitive elections, as is the number of competitive parties. This means that we should expect to see above average voter turnout and competitiveness in the years before RFD associated with high levels of route allocation. If these variables drop in the period after RFD, either because politicians have bought votes and reduced competition or because of regressions to the mean, OLS estimates will suffer from a downward biased.
We can test this hypothesis directly. Using a cross-section of our data (using only 1908 values) we regressed the number of routes allocated to a county as a function of county characteristics and a dummy variable equal to one if the county was within a district with a competitive election before the introduction of RFD, and zero otherwise. We constructed a set of dummy variables, indicating whether a district had an election with a margin of victory of 20 percentage points or less or 10 points for less, in any of the three elections prior to the establishment of RFD (1896, 1898, 1900) .
12 Table 4 presents the results for these regressions. Depending on how the close elections are defined, counties within competitive districts enjoyed between 0.84 and 1.27 more RFD routes, a 6%-9% increase. These results support the claim that our downward bias in our OLS estimates, and confirm the need of instrumental variables to obtain unbiased estimates of causal effect.
Instrumental Variables Estimation
To address the bias of the fixed effects coefficients, we use two sets of instruments for the number of routes a county receives. In choosing suitable instruments, we focus on the requirement that routes be along passable roads. The ability for communities to successfully petition for an RFD route was a function of the quality of roads over that time period. With the existence of place fixed effects, our goal is to find variables that will affect road quality in a time-invariant way. Therefore, even if the instrumental variable is correlated with levels of political activity, it will fall into the place fixed effect, and will be uncorrelated with the error term in our second stage regression.
We use two instruments, the first is the county-level spending of roads and bridges in 1890. At that time, counties and townships bore the brunt of road funding (Fuller, 1955) .
Because 1890 is well before the establishment of even the experimental RFD routes, and before the creation of the Office of Road Inquiry in 1893, which would later become the National Highway Administration, it would have been impossible for county officials to have anticipated federal help or to build roads in anticipation of preferential rural route allocation.
Additionally, with the establishment of the Office of Road Inquiry, government responsibility for roads no longer fell on counties, so concerns of auto-correlation of county spending in 12 About 51% of counties were in districts that had at least one election with a margin of victory less than 20 points, and about 46% in districts with margins of victory less than 10 points. years during our sample are minimized.
Our other instrument is a set of laws that outline the statutory environment in each state at the onset of RFD route allocation. Between 1888 and 1895, almost every state passed numerous laws related to roads.
13 The nature of these laws had lasting impacts on the ability of rural communities to establish roads. Therefore, these laws can be used as instruments for route allocation. We use these state-level laws in combination with the county-level instruments. More detail on the data for these instruments is provided in Appendix B.
Thus, the first stage of our two stage least squares estimation is:
where Routes ct is the number of routes in county c and year t; Laws c is the set of law dummies; Spending c is spending on roads in 1890; δ t and γ c are time and county fixed effects;
X ct is the set of covariates used in our second stage. We interact each of our instruments with a P ost ct dummy variable, equal to one if the year is 1908 or after, and zero otherwise.
Due to the existence of place fixed effects, we are essentially estimating the change in routes between the pre-and post-rollout years. Table 5 shows the results for this regression, performed separately for the county and state-level variables. Increased spending on roads and bridges in 1890 is associated with increased RFD route allocation a decade later. The coefficients on the set of law dummy variables, equal to one if the state has a law of this type and zero otherwise, reveal a complex relationship between the statutory environment and the allocation of routes. While laws providing mechanisms for oversight and governance over the roads appears to increase the number of routs a county receives, laws allocating state funds, or the use of convict labor led to a decrease in the number of routes. These laws may have been aimed at the construction of highways, and diverted resources away from rural roads. The cliché of prisoners breaking rocks stems from the use of convict labor to make gravel, which was used for highways, not for rural roads. As the F-statistics show, while each of our county-level instruments is sufficiently strong, the set of state laws is too weak to be used as an instrument by itself.
14 We use both the county level and state-level instruments together in all IV regressions.
If the instruments are valid, time shocks should be identical across difference values of the instrument. To test this, we separate our sample into counties that spend positive amounts on roads and bridges in 1890, and counties that spent nothing. Figure 5 shows that the behavior of counties that spent positive amounts of money on roads and bridges appears to follow the same trends as counties that spent nothing. Additionally, the causal effect can also be more easily seen in Figure 5 . Since counties that spent positive amounts on roads received more treatment, we would expect to see upwards shifts in the trends of those counties between the pre-and post-rollout periods. In the second through forth panels of Figure 5 , in the post-rollout period counties that spent money on roads are consistently voting for a larger number of parties. The trends within both periods are parallel, and the shift that occurred between the two periods is a visual representation of the causal effect.
IV Results
The results from the IV regression are presented in Table 6 . these results indicate that RFD had a significant impact on the political landscape. For all regressions, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic is 10.6, indicating that weak instruments are not a concern with this specification.
To summarize, the IV regressions for each of our county-level voter behavior variables show the presence of downward bias in OLS regressions. We fail to find a statistically significant effect of the number of routes on the turnout of Congressional elections. For each of our measures of the distribution of votes across a county, the IV regressions are roughly consistent with the OLS findings, the point estimates are larger: RFD routes lead to a wider distribution of votes across parties, with increased vote shares for small parties.
Potential Mechanisms
The results presented up to this point have not made any attempt to disentangle the mechanisms through which RFD affected political behavior. Therefore, it is difficult to determine if RFD changed political behavior because of increases in the mail, increases in road quality, To test the hypothesis that newspapers were an important mechanism through which RFD routes affected political behavior, we compared the causal effect of RFD in counties with and without newspapers. 16 We then ran the IV regressions outlined above.
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Our results, shown in Table 7 demonstrate that, across all of our outcome variables, the causal effect of RFD is more positive in counties with daily newspapers. The effect of routes on turnout is positive in counties with newspapers, but mildly negative in counties without newspapers, though neither point estimate is statistically different from zero. For measures of the number of competitive parties, the causal effect in counties with newspapers is at least four times as large as counties without newspapers, and though the point estimates for the vote share of small parties is similar in counties with and without newspapers (columns 9 and 10), it is only statistically significant in counties with newspapers. If RFD only affected political behavior only through the impact of better roads (or any other mechanism that was independent of newspapers), we would expect the coefficient on the number of routes would be identical for both groups. The fact that a causal effect is observed in counties without daily newspapers does not mean that newspapers could not have affected voters in these areas. As we only observe where papers were printed, not where they were consumed, we cannot claim that counties without newspapers had no newspaper readers. These results are suggestive, not conclusive, evidence that newspaper played a critical role in the political changes that occurred because of RFD.
Congressional Representatives
With richer information networks, voters may select different attributes for their Representatives, or they may elicit different actions from elected officials. Taking wishes, but will only do so if they are aware of the Representative's actions. Therefore, if one subset of voters receives a positive shock in their access to information, we would expect to observe a shift in the policy positions of elected officials towards positions favorable to this better-informed subset. Additionally, the increase in turnout by counties may change the identity of the median voter, resulting in changes of the characteristics of the elected official. By using DW-Nominate scores, which measure the voting behavior of officials along a 2-dimensional policy space, and the voting behavior on two contentious issues, temperance and immigration, we estimate the effect of rural routes on the policy decisions of representatives.
Policy Position Scores
The DW-Nominate scores give each elected member of the House of Representatives two scores, which represent their policy stances based on roll-call votes over two separate dimensions. The first dimension represents the traditional liberal-conservative stances and will be the focus of our analysis. We use the DW-Nominate first dimension score as our dependent variable in both the OLS and IV specifications above, along with a political party dummy variables, equal to one if the Representative is a member of the Republican party, and zero otherwise. Because the DW-Nominate score only varies at the congressional district level, we aggregate each of our county-level variables up to the district level.
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Though the shift in American political parties around turn of the twentieth century have been written about extensively, the role of RFD in this transition has not previously been explored. Our findings provide evidence that the program was an important factor in the policies chosen by elected officials.
We first consider what stances were typically associated with rural communities over our sample period. Figure 6 shows the correlation between the percentage of urban residents in a district, and the policy stances of elected officials. Even when controlling for party membership, rural districts feature more negative DW-Nominate scores. Therefore, we would expect RFD routes to result in a negative shift in the policy scores of elected officials. 
Temperance and Immigration
In order to illustrate shifts in Representatives' positions, we examine two issues that were particularly contentious in this period: pro-temperance policies and immigration restrictions.
A number of issues saw differential support in rural and urban areas, including RFD itself, and thus could potentially be used to examine Representatives' responsiveness to increased voter monitoring. Pushes for immigration restrictions and the prohibition of alcohol were tied to the Nativist movement, which sought to restrict the spread of foreign in-migration and culture in America. Nativists, who were frequently rural Protestants, often took aim at Irish Roman Catholics and Jewish Americans, for whom alcohol was part of their culture.
Both pro-temperance policies and immigration restrictions are policies that voters had strong preferences about but were somewhat remote from rural voters' lives. Although support for both policies came from a variety of groups, support was systematically greater in rural areas (Engs, 2003, pg. 263 ). Thus, they may have been likely points of compromise for rural representatives, absent strong monitoring.
We chose these two issues for a number of reasons. First, and most importantly, they For each vote coded by DW-Nominate as pertaining to temperance policies or immigration restriction, we used the Congressional Record to determine if a "yea" (or a "nay") vote is a vote explicitly for or against, or if the vote was not clearly taking a position (e.g. procedural vote). Table 9 examines the relationship between RFD routes and votes supporting temperance;
the "for" columns estimate the number of times the Representative from a congregational district voted explicitly for a temperance-related policy, whereas the "against" columns estimate the number of times a Representative explicitly voted against a temperance-related policy.
19 Columns 1 and 3 use the basic fixed effects frame work discussed above, while columns 2 and 4 are IV estimates. These estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the number of RFD routes leads to 0.92 more votes for temperance and a decrease of 0.84 votes against it in a given district; 20 the 62nd and 63rd Congresses voted on temperance-related issues three times in each congress, while the 64th Congress voted six times. The within-Representative increase in likelihood to vote for temperance explains about 40% of this within district change, with changes in the identity of the Representative explaining the rest.
Similarly, Table 10 
Concluding Remarks
Timely and affordable access to information is a major driver of both economic and political activity. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century public information was largely conveyed through newspapers, making access to the public discourse contingent on timely and convenient access to the daily paper. In pre-WWI America, newspapers were delivered to non-urban readers via the Post Office, meaning that access to discourse was contingent 19 In each of these, absence from the vote or a "present" vote are coded as a zero. 20 The coefficient on the dummy for the presence of women's suffrage is shown here. As one might expect given the strong support many feminist groups gave to temperance policies (as increased alcohol consumption is strongly related to increased domestic violence), the presence of women in the electorate is correlated with Representatives supporting temperance. on access to mail. Like the internet, mail is a bi-directional medium. It allows individuals to share information, and serves as a conduit for mass media. The implementation of Rural Free Delivery dramatically increased rural America's connection to the outside world, making it feasible to get daily news, and reducing the cost of private communication. Rural residents no longer need made a weekly trip into town to receive mail from the local fourth class postmaster, but instead had it delivered to a box near their home. We use panel data on the rollout of RFD as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the impact of access to information on voters' and elected Representatives' behavior. In doing so, we shed light on how increased information flows changed political outcomes by increasing political participation and voice for rural areas.
RFD significantly increased the consumption of daily newspapers. We estimate that there was a 25% increase in the circulation of newspapers in areas which received the service.
The rural resident became better-informed the political goings on far from his farm gate, increasing their effective voice as citizens. It made rural voters better informed about political issues, and about the range of available parties, allowing them to better select their preferred candidates. It increased the constituency for parties and candidates willing to tailor their message more precisely to rural needs, and pushed the political positions of representatives towards the preferences of rural voters, as seen in the issues of temperance and immigration.
Our results suggest that RFD had a substantial effect on the political behavior of rural citizens. While rural mail routes did not lead to an increase in voter turnout, it broadened the number of political parties able to appeal to rural voters, as a standard deviation change in routes led to 0.4 additional parties receiving a competitive percent of the votes. RFD routes also increased the vote share for smaller political parties, many of which were advocating for policies in line with rural tastes. Both of these results are driven largely by counties who received newspapers in 1900. This suggests that a larger group of parties were able to access and appeal to rural voters. RFD also allowed farmers to more effectively monitor their elected Representatives, leading to more effective political voice for rural residences. An increase of one standard deviation in routes led to a negative shift of 0.71 standard deviations in their Representative's DWNominate score, moving it towards positions popular in rural areas, even after controlling for party affiliation. Examples of this effect in action are the findings that an increase of one standard deviation in RFD routes led to 0.9 more votes for temperance, whereas for immigration restrictions, it increased votes for by 0.6. These changes in elected officials stances came through two channels: roughly one half is from incumbents adapting their positions, and the other half is from changes from electing Representatives who held different positions.
Our results provide support to theories of political empowerment, as voters with increased access to mail and news behave differently, and elicit more favorable political outcomes from their elected officials. RFD, in increasing individuals' access to information and newspapers, in turn increased their social capital. The service also changed the inequality of that capital across the urban/rural divide. The importance of social capital on the development and evolution of democracies has been well established (Lipset, 1959; Woolcock, 2001) , as has the role of information networks and access to mass media (Blair, 2000) . Through our study of RFD, we have been able to more fully explore the mechanisms through which this development occurs, and show the importance of information networks on the Democratic process.
A Appendices

A.1 Appendix A: First-Differences Analysis
An alternative specification to the fixed effects analysis described above is first-differences.
Because our treatment variable does not vary within the pre-and post-rollout time periods, we simply take the change in the average between the pre-and post-rollout periods. One concern with the fixed effects analysis is that the accuracy of our estimates could derive from the numerous pre-and post-election observations for the same county, instead of from variation in the instrument or the number of routes.
The specification for the first-differences IV regression is:
where ∆Y c is the change in the average of each of our outcome variables between 1900 and 1908. We calculated each variable by taking the average within a county over all elections held in 1908 and later, and subtracting from this value the average of all elections held in 1900 and before. ∆Routes c is the change in RFD routes between 1900 and 1908. Spend c is the road-spending instrument, and Laws c the set of state laws.
Results of the IV regressions are presented in Table 11 Clubb et al. (2006) ; newspaper data are from the N.W. Ayer and Son's American Newspaper Annual, and Gentzkow et al. (2012) ; county characteristics are from Haines (2010) (county boundaries fixed at 1890 values as in Hornbeck (2010) 
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(8) (2010)); spending are collected from the "Report on Wealth, Debt, and Taxation" (Upton, J.K., 1895); state laws information are from Stone (1894 Stone ( , 1896 . (2010)); spending are collected from the "Report on Wealth, Debt, and Taxation" (Upton, J.K., 1895); state laws information are from Stone (1894 Stone ( , 1896 . (2010)); spending are collected from the "Report on Wealth, Debt, and Taxation" (Upton, J.K., 1895); state laws information are from Stone (1894 Stone ( , 1896 .
